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Abstract—We study the transmission of confidential messages
across a wireless broadcast channel with K > 2 receivers and K
helpers. The goal is to transmit all messages reliably to their
intended receivers while keeping them confidential from the
unintended receivers. We design a codebook based on nested
lattice structure, cooperative jamming, lattice alignment, and
i.i.d. coding. Moreover, we exploit the asymmetric compute-and-
forward decoding strategy to handle finite SNR regimes. Unlike
previous alignment schemes, our achievable rates are attainable
at any finite SNR value. Also, we show that our scheme achieves
the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom of 1 for the K-receiver
Gaussian broadcast channel with K confidential messages and
K helpers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer security has been widely studied under dif-
ferent communication scenarios. The encoding strategies have
been used to analyze these security scenarios can be grouped
in two main categories: i.i.d. random coding and structured
coding. Several achievability schemes were proposed within
the first category. Csiszar and Korner discussed transmitting
a confidential message over a broadcast channel with one
legitimate receiver and one passive eavesdropper [1]; capacity
results were obtained for a less noisy channel using random
i.i.d. codes. Recently, several works in the second category
shed lights on the advantage of structured codes in achiev-
ing security. In the absence of capacity results for different
communication channels in general cases (i.e., no assumption
on degradedness or specific channel gains), researchers have
studied the secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) in the infinite
SNR regime. Despite the promising performance that Gaussian
i.i.d. codes show in maintaining reliability in AWGN channels,
studies show that they achieve zero sum secure degrees of
freedom [2] and [3]. In contrast, structured codes attain
a positive secure degrees of freedom [4], [5], and [6]. In
[5], a collection of one-hop communication scenarios were
considered including the wiretap Gaussian broadcast channel
with helpers. Xie and Ulukus in [5] and [7] suggested an
achievable scheme for the considered security scenarios which
was based on real alignment encoding, cooperative jamming,
and maximum likelihood decoder which operated in the infi-
nite SNR regime; they showed that following their schemes,
optimal sum secure degrees of freedom are achievable. Also,
in [8] and [3], a lattice-based scheme was proposed for the
Gaussian wiretap channel with one helper which was optimal
at infinite SNR for a subset of channel gains.
A lattice-based framework known as the compute-and-
forward framework [9] was proposed to handle interference
which enabled the decoder to decode integer linear combi-
nations of the transmitted codewords. In [6] and [10], we
investigated the Gaussian wiretap multiple-access channel and
the two-user Gaussian interference channel with confiden-
tial messages, respectively. For these models, we introduced
achievable schemes which, unlike previous works, could op-
erate at any finite SNR value and for almost all (real) channel
gains. Furthermore, we derived constant gap results for the
sum secure capacity. In this paper, we study the Gaussian
broadcast channel with K receivers and K helpers for K > 2.
The case of K = 2 with one helper was studied in [5] and
optimal s.d.o.f. was obtained.
In our model, the transmitter has an independent message
for each receiver which needs to be kept confidential from
other receivers. A set of K helpers implicitly cooperate
with the transmitter by sending out jamming signals with
proper beam-forming, to assist the transmitter in preserving
the confidentiality of messages at the unintended receivers.
We propose an achievability scheme which works at any SNR
value and for almost all real-valued channel gains1. We offer
a set of lower bounds on individual secure rates and show
that the sum secure rate is within a constant gap from the
sum secure capacity for this channel model. Our achievable
scheme combines the idea of jamming signals and beam-
forming with asymptotic alignment in [7] and a generalization
of the compute-and-forward framework in [11]. We extend
the nested lattice framework of [11] to ensure security in our
scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II,
we formally state the problem, in Sec. III our main results
are presented. Sec. IV is devoted to the achievability scheme
along with proofs of reliability and security analysis. Finally,
The paper is concluded in Sec. V.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We study the K-receiver Gaussian broadcast channel with
confidential messages. The transmitter has K confidential
messages, W1,W2, . . . ,WK , for receivers 1, 2, . . . ,K, respec-
tively. Each receiver acts as a passive eavesdropper with
respect to all messages excluding its own intended message.
In addition, there are K helpers sending jamming signals to
protect the confidentiality of messages at unintended receivers.
The goal is to ensure the reliability of the intended messages
1Except for a set of channel gains with small Lebesgue measure.
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Fig. 1: The K-receiver Gaussian broadcast channel with
confidential messages and K helpers.
and the confidentiality of the unintended messages. The rela-
tion among the transmitter’s and the helpers’ inputs and the
output of the channel at receiver ` is determined as:
y` = h`x +
K∑
i=1
gi`x
J
i + z` (1)
y` is receiver `’s observation from the channel, x is the
N -length input vector transmitted by the transmitter, h` is
the main channel gain from the transmitter to receiver `.
Moreover, xJi is the jamming signal transmitted by the i-th
helper, gi` is the gain of the channel between helper i and
receiver `. Note that we consider real-valued channel gains in
our model. Finally, z` is an independent i.i.d. Gaussian noise
with zero means and unit variances. The power constraints
at the transmitter and the helpers are given as ‖x‖2 ≤
NP and
∑K
i=1 ‖xJi ‖2 ≤ NP . The confidential message,
W`, is independent of all other messages and is uniformly
distributed over the set {1, . . . , 2NR`}, for ` ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
The transmitter maps the messages to codeword x through a
stochastic encoder, i.e., x = E(W1,W2, . . . ,WK). At receiver
`, decoder D` estimates the respective transmitted message as
Wˆ` = D`(y`). Figure 1 illustrates the communication model.
Definition 1 (Achievable secure rates): For the K-receiver
Gaussian broadcast channel with K independent confiden-
tial messages, a non-negative rate tuple (R1, R2, . . . , RK) is
achievable, if for any  > 0 and sufficiently large N , there exist
encoder E and decoders {D`}K`=1 such that ∀` ∈ {1, . . . ,K}:
Prob (D`(y`) 6= W`) <  (2)
R` ≤ 1
N
H(W`|y1, . . . ,y`−1,y`+1, . . . ,yK) +  (3)
Inequalities (2) and (3) capture the reliability and the confi-
dentiality constraints of message W`, respectively; the confi-
dentiality constraint ensures weak secrecy [12]. The secrecy
capacity region is the supremum over all the achievable secure
rate tuples.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We present our main result as a set of lower bounds on the
individual secrecy rates of the confidential messages. We also
Fig. 2: The encoding steps performed by the transmitter for each
confidential message.
present the sum secure degrees of freedom attainable by our
scheme.
Theorem 1: For the K-user Gaussian broadcast chan-
nel with K helpers, any non-negative secure rate tuple
(R1, R2, . . . , RK) satisfying the following inequalities is
achievable with weak secrecy.
R`<R
(`)
comb,K−
1
2
max
k∈{1,...,K}
k 6=`
log
(∑M
m=1(h
2
kPm`+g
2
`kP
J
m`)
g2`kP
J
m′`
)
(4)
The rate R(`)comb,K is defined as the optimal achievable rate at
which receiver ` decodes the K-th linear integer combination
using the compute-and-forward strategy. Also, M is the
number of dimensions used in the beam-forming operation
and m is the dimension index. Pm` is the power allocated
to encode the m-th component of the `-th confidential
message. P Jm` is the power used by helper ` to encode
the m-th component of its jamming signal. Lastly, P Jm′` is
the smallest power among the powers used to encode the
components of the jamming signal by helper `, in our design
this is also smaller than Pm`, ∀m. Also, the power allocated
to encode helper `’s jamming signal is chosen such that
g2``
∑
m P
J
m` < 1.
Remark 1: The set of achievable rates in (4) for all
` ∈ {1, . . . ,K} can be optimized over the choice of power
allocations in the transmitter and the helpers as long as the
following conditions are satisfied:
g2``
M∑
m=1
P Jm`<1, P
J
m1`<Pm2` ∀m1,m2∈[1,M ], ∀`∈[1,K] (5)
K∑
`=1
M∑
m=1
Pm` ≤ P ,
K∑
`=1
M∑
m=1
P Jm` ≤ P. (6)
Our achievable scheme is based on rate-splitting, nested lattice
coding, i.i.d. repetitions, cooperative jamming, and beam-
forming. Figure 2 illustrates the block diagram of the encoding
steps at the transmitter. The decoding is performed accord-
ing to the asymmetric compute-and-forward strategy at the
receivers. The detailed description is provided in Sec. IV.
Corollary 1: Following our scheme, at each receiver, a 1K
secure degrees of freedom is achievable for the receiver’s
intended message; hence, the optimal sum secure degrees of
freedom of 1 is achievable, i.e.,
s.d.o.f. , lim
P→∞
∑K
`=1R`
1
2 log(1 + P )
= 1 (7)
Corollary 1 is proven in Sec. IV.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
We describe our achievable scheme for K = 3 receivers
and three helpers to better clarify the key ideas in our coding
scheme. Then, we generalize our scheme to any arbitrary
K > 2 receivers with K helpers. We begin with codebook
construction at the transmitter and then we describe the
codebook construction at the helpers.
A. Codebook construction
The transmitter generates a lattice vector for each indepen-
dent confidential message. The lattice vectors are drawn from
a set of nested lattice sets.
Consider pairs of coarse and fine lattices as (Λm` ,Λ
m
f,`) for
each pair (m, `) ∈ {1, . . . , T 4}×{1, 2, 3}. Similarly, consider
pairs (ΛmJi,Λ
m
f,Ji) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and m ∈ {1, . . . , T 4}. The
subscript f specifies the fine lattice in the pair. T is some large
number; let us define M , T 4. Assume that these lattices are
nested according to the following chain:
Λ⊆Λm3 ⊆Λm2 ⊆Λm1 ⊆Λm3J⊆Λm2J⊆Λm1J⊆Λmf,3...
⊆Λmf,2⊆Λmf,1⊆Λmf,3J⊆Λmf,2J⊆Λmf,1J (8)
The above coarse lattice sets are scaled such that their second
moments are equal to σ2m3, σ
2
m2, σ
2
m1, σ
2
m,3J , σ
2
m,2J , σ
2
m,1J ,
respectively. We denote the fundamental Voronoi region of the
coarse lattice Λm` as Vm` ; similarly, the fundamental Voronoi
region of the coarse lattice ΛmiJ is denoted as VmiJ . The centers
of the cosets of the fine lattice sets Λmf,` and Λ
m
f,iJ are both
n-length lattice words, which are the realizations of the n-
length random vector tm` and umi, respectively. The inner
codebook associated with sub-message (m, `) is defined as
Lm` , {tm`|tm` ∈ Vm` }. Also, the inner codebook Lm,Ji is
similarly defined for the collection of the jamming codewords
umi and is used by the i-th helper.
Consider a probability distribution P (tm`) over the code-
book Lm`. To generate the outer codebooks for sub-message
(m, `), the transmitter acts as follows: from codebook Lm` and
according to distribution P (tm`), it draws B i.i.d. copies of
codewords tm` and then, it concatenates the drawn vectors.
The resulting codeword which has length N , n × B is
considered as one realization of the outer codeword t¯m`. The
transmitter generates 2NR
`
comb3,m realizations of random vector
t¯m`, where R`comb3,m > 0 and R
`
comb,3 ,
∑M
m=1R
`
comb3,m.
The collection of the generated codewords is termed the outer
codebook for sub-message (m, `) and denoted as Cm`. The
outer codebook at helper i, generated in a similar manner, and
denoted as Cm,iJ . Note that the idea behind the i.i.d. repetitions
of the inner codewords is to take advantage of the Packing
lemma in the proof of weak secrecy. 2
Next step in the codebook construction is the random parti-
tioning. For each sub-message codebook Cm`, the transmitter
randomly partitions the outer codewords into 2NRm` bins of
2Packing Lemma is deduced by applying the joint typicality lemma on i.i.d.
random sequences [13].
equal sizes. The transmitter chooses the non-negative rates
Rm` such that R` =
∑M
m=1Rm`, where
R`,R(`)comb,3− maxk∈{1,2,3}
k 6=`
(
1
2
log
(∑
m(h
2
kPm`+g
2
`kP
J
m`)
g2`kP
J
m′`
))
+`, (9)
in which term ` vanishes as the block length increases.
To each partition, an index wm` ∈ {1, . . . , 2NRm`} is ran-
domly assigned. Additionally, for each sub-message wm`, the
transmitter generates a random dither vector dm` drawn from
a uniform distribution over the Voronoi region Vm` . The outer
dither codewords d¯m` are constructed as described before.
B. Encoding
The transmitter encodes the confidential message w` by
dividing the message into M = T 4 independent sub-messages,
where T is a large number. It is worth to mention that M is the
number of dimensions used in beam-forming the signals. Our
ultimate goal is to align codewords at the unintended receivers
with the jamming signals in many dimensions. Each sub-
message is denoted by indices (m, `), where m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
and ` ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and is encoded separately. To encode the
sub-message wm`, the transmitter picks randomly a codeword
t¯m` from the corresponding codebook Cm`. It then dithers the
extracted codeword and reduces the sum through a modular
operation over the corresponding coarse lattice, i.e.,
x˜m` ,
[
t¯m` + d¯m`
]
mod Λm` (10)
The modular operation in (10) is done block-wise for each
block of length n. Next, we apply beam-forming such that each
codeword x˜m` scaled as xm` , x˜m`.f(m, `,h,g1,g2,g3),
where h , [h1, h2, h3]T , gi , [gi1, gi2, gi3]T , and f(.) is
a mapping which takes the indices and the channel gains
as inputs and outputs an scalar value. The mapping f , is
chosen such that the codewords xm` for all (m, `) are ra-
tionally independent for all channel gain vectors, except for
a small Lebesgue measure. We will expand on the mapping
f shortly. The transmitter sends codeword x ,
∑K
`=1 x`,
where x` ,
∑M
m=1 xm`, across the channel. The power
allocated to sub-codeword (m, `) is defined as Pm` ,
σ2m`.|f(m, `,h,g1,g2,g3)|2. It is worth mentioning that the
lattice sets in (8) are scaled such that the power allocations
Pm` and P Jm` satisfy the constraints in (5-6).
Encoding at helper ` is performed as follows: for each
m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, it randomly picks a jamming codeword,
u¯m`, from codebook Cm,`J . It then dithers the codeword
and performs the modular operation using lattice Λm`J to
generate x˜Jm`. Next, it constructs codeword x
J
m` as x
J
m` ,
x˜Jm`.f(m, `,h,g1,g2,g3). Eventually, helper ` transmits sig-
nal xJ` =
∑
m x
J
m` through the channel. We denote the power
of the transmitted codeword by helper ` as P J` which is
defined as P J` ,
∑M
m=1 P
J
m` over index m, where P
J
m` is
defined similar to Pm`. The construction of the beam-forming
function f is performed such that the desired alignments are
formed. For K = 3 receivers, and for a given `, codeword
x` should get aligned with jamming codeword xJ` at receivers
k 6= `. For instance, codeword x1 needs to be aligned with
jamming codeword xJ1 at receivers 2 and 3. This requires
that the same pairs of codewords get aligned at multiple
receivers, simultaneously. To this end, we take advantage of
the asymptotic alignment technique, (introduced in [14] and
used in [7] for real-alignment), to align the N -dimensional
lattice codewords. To do so, consider a one-to-one mapping
φ3 : {1, . . . ,M} → {1, . . . , T} × {1, . . . , T} × {1, . . . , T} ×
{1, . . . , T}. We design the beam-forming function, f , for the
three-receiver Gaussian broadcast channel with channel gain
vectors h,g1,g2,g3 as
f(m, 1,h,g1,g2,g3) = h
r1
2 h
r2
3 g
r3
12g
r4
13 (11)
f(m, 2,h,g1,g2,g3) = h
r1
1 h
r2
3 g
r3
21g
r4
23 (12)
f(m, 3,h,g1,g2,g3) = h
r1
1 h
r2
2 g
r3
31g
r4
32 (13)
(r1, r2, r3, r4) = φ
3(m), m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. (14)
Following the results in [14] and [7], it can be shown that
for large enough values of M our beam-forming function
asymptotically provides the desired alignments at the receivers
simultaneously. In other words, the desired alignments be-
tween the pair of codewords happen in many dimensions
which asymptotically yields perfect alignment.
C. Decoding
We describe decoding at receiver 1; other receivers act in
a similar manner. Receiver 1 observes the following sequence
from the channel:
y1 = h1
M∑
m=1
xm1 +
M∑
m=1
(h1xm2 + g21x
J
m2)
+
M∑
m=1
(h1xm3 + g31x
J
m3) +
M∑
m=1
g11x
J
m1 + z1 (15)
Due to beam-forming in (11)-(13), the sub-message codewords
associated with confidential message W2 and the jamming sub-
codewords of helper 2 are aligned in the second term of (15).
Similarly, the corresponding sub-codewords in the third term
of the equation (15) are aligned. Moreover, according to (5),
power of the fourth term in (15) falls below noise level; as it
carries no useful information regarding the messages, receiver
1 treats the fourth term as noise. Consequently, receiver 1
decodes the following effective 3-user multiple-access channel
in which the power of the effective noise z˜1 is normalized. We
have
y˜1=
h1√
g211P
J
1 +1
M∑
m=1
xm1+
1√
g211P
J
1 +1
M∑
m=1
(h1xm2+g21x
J
m2)
+
1√
g211P
J
1 + 1
M∑
m=1
(h1xm3 + g31x
J
m3) + z˜1 (16)
Receiver 1 decodes three effective lattice codewords, i.e.,
xeff,1 ,
∑M
m=1 xm1, xeff,2 ,
∑M
m=1(h1xm2 + g21x
J
m2),
and xeff,3 ,
∑M
m=1(h1xm3 + g31x
J
m3). In other words,
the effective channel vector heff,1 at receiver 1 is defined
as heff,1,
[
h1√
g211P
J
1 +1
, 1√
g211P
J
1 +1
, 1√
g211P
J
1 +1
]T
, and subse-
quently, the power scaling factor which determines the ratios
of the power of effective codewords with respect to the power
constraint is beff,1,
[√
P1
P ,
√
h21P2+g
2
21P
J
2
P ,
√
h21P3+g
2
31P
J
3
P
]T
.
According to the asymmetric compute-and-forward technique
and Theorem 7 in [11], receiver 1 finds the optimal set of
linearly independent integer-valued coefficient vectors, which
maximizes the achievable sum rate, to construct the integer
combinations and then it decodes the integer combinations
successively. We denote these vectors as a1, a2, and a3.
Upon decoding the first integer combination, the codeword
belonging to the densest lattice inner codebook is decoded.
Let us denote the first integer combination by vector v1 ,∑3
`=1 a1(`)xeff,`. Receiver 1 decodes v1 as follows:[
s1 , β1y˜1 −
3∑
`=1
a1(`)d¯`
]
mod Λ = [v1 + zeff,1] mod Λ,
(17)
in which the effective noise of the first integer combination
is defined as zeff,1 ,
∑3
`=1 (β1heff,1(`)− a1(`))xeff,` +
β1z˜1. To decode the integer combination v1, receiver 1 com-
putes the quantization value of s1 under the densest lattice
among the lattice sets used for encoding {xeff,`}3`=1. Let
us denote the index of the corresponding effective codeword
with k. Then, according to Theorem 2 in [11] we have:
R1comb,1 , 12 log(
Peff,k
σ2eff,1
). R1comb,1 is the optimal achievable
rate at which the first integer combination is decoded at
receiver 1. Similarly, we can define R1comb,2 and R
1
comb,3 as
the optimal rates of decoding the second and the third integer
combinations at receiver 1, respectively. Peff,k is the power of
the k-th effective codeword and σ2eff,1 is the variance of the
effective noise associated with the first integer combination,
i.e., zeff,1. Receiver 1 proceeds with decoding the next
integer combinations of the effective codewords. However, to
maximize the achievable rates, receiver 1 first cancels out the
contribution of the previously decoded codewords from the
current combination and then the codeword with the highest
rate among the remaining codewords in the integer combina-
tion gets decoded. Assume that the effective codewords are
decoded in the order specified by pi−1(1), pi−1(2), pi−1(3),
where pi(.) is a one-to-one permutation operator over the
set {1, 2, 3}. Then, following Theorem 2 in [11], the k-th
optimal achievable combination rate is given as R1comb,k ,
1
2 log
(
Peff,pi−1(k)
σ2eff,k
)
, where σ2eff,k is the variance of the ef-
fective noise in k-th integer combination. Note that upon
decoding each combination, the effective codeword which
was constructed using the densest lattice (highest rate) among
the participating codewords in the combination is decoded.
Therefore, the order among the variances of the effective
noises is given as σ2eff,1 ≤ σ2eff,2 ≤ σ2eff,3. Note that the
goal is to obtain a lower-bound on the achievable rate of
xeff,1. According to the definition of R1comb,k and the order
among the variances, Reff,1 ≥ R1comb,3. Therefore, receiver
1 can reliably decode its intended codeword so long as it is
generated at a rate Reff,1 ≤ 12 log( P1σ2eff,3 ). Note that, given
the optimal integer-valued coefficient vectors, i.e., a1,a2,a3,
the variance σ2eff,3 is a function of β3. It can be shown that
the optimal choice for β3 which minimizes σ2eff,3 is the MSE
factor [11], i.e, β3 =
E[(
∑3
`=1 a3(`)xeff,`) y˜1]
E[y˜21]
. The integer-
valued coefficients can be computed using the LLL reduction
algorithm in [15] which provides a polynomial-time solution
and computes a nearly optimal set of integer-valued coefficient
vectors. 3 The proof of reliability at other receivers can be done
similarly. So far, we showed that for a confidential message `,
any non-negative rate below R`comb,3 can be decoded reliably
at receiver ` which ensures the reliability of the rates in
Theorem 1. Next section is devoted to the analysis of security.
D. Security analysis
In this section, we show that our achievable scheme provides
weak secrecy for all messages at the unintended receivers, i.e.,
1
nB
I(W1,...,W`−1,W`+1,...,WK ;y`)≤, ∀`∈{1,...,K} (18)
in which  > 0 tends to zero as n and B approach infinity.
For simplicity, we shall prove (18) for K = 3 receivers; the
extension of the proof to an arbitrary K > 2 is straightforward.
We proceed the proof by showing the weak secrecy of the joint
messages (W2,W3) at receiver 1, i.e., 1nB I(W2,W3;y1) ≤ .
We have 1nB I(W2,W3;y1) ≤ 1nB I(W2,W3;y1, t¯1), there-
fore,
1
nB
I(W2,W3;y1) ≤
3∑
`=2
R` −
1
nB
H(W2,W3|y1, t¯1), (19)
in which t¯` , (t¯1`, . . . , t¯m`, . . . , t¯M`). We proceed by lower
bounding the second term in (19):
1
nB
H(W2,W3|y1,t¯1)=
1
nB
H(W2,W3,t¯2,t¯3|y1,t¯1)
− 1
nB
H(t¯2, t¯3|y1, t¯1,W2,W3)
≥ 1
nB
H(t¯2, t¯3|y1, t¯1)−
1
nB
H(t¯2, t¯3|y1, t¯1,W2,W3)
(a)
≥ 1
nB
H(t¯2, t¯3|y1, t¯1)− 223
(b)
≥ 1
nB
H(t¯2, t¯3|y1, t¯1, D, z1)− 223
(c)
=
1
nB
H
(
t¯2 ,¯t3
∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=1
(h1xm2+g21x
J
m2),
M∑
m=1
(h1xm3+g31x
J
m3),¯t1,D,z1
)
−223
(d)
=
1
nB
H
(
t¯2 ,¯t3
∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=1
(h1fm2t¯m2+g21fm2u¯m2),
M∑
m=1
(h1fm3t¯m3+g31fm3u¯m3),¯t1,D,z1
)
−223
(e)
=
1
nB
H
(
t¯2 ,¯t3
∣∣∣∣ M∑
m=1
(t˜m2+u˜m2),
M∑
m=1
(t˜m3+u˜m3),¯t1,D,z1
)
−223 (20)
In the above arguments, inequality (a) holds due to Lemma 1
in [6]. Inequality (b) is true since conditioning reduces entropy.
Equality (c) is deduced from expression (15) and definition of
xm`. Equality (d) is deduced from (10) and after subtracting
dithers. Also, equality (e) comes from defining the lattice
3Due to space limitation, we will include numerical results in the extended
version of this paper.
vectors h1fm2t¯m2, g21fm2u¯m2, h1fm3t¯m3, and g31fm3u¯m3
as lattice vectors t˜m2, u˜m2, t˜m3, and u˜m3, respectively.
Now, assume that among the nested coarse lattices
{Λm2}Mm=1 and {ΛJm2}Mm=1, lattice ΛJm′2 is the densest lattice
for some m′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and similarly, assume among
the nested coarse lattices {Λm2}Mm=1 and {ΛJm3}Mm=1, lattice
ΛJm′′3 is the densest lattice for some m
′′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Then,
following the expression in (20), we have:
1
nB
H(W2,W3|y1 ,¯t1)≥
1
nB
H
(
t¯2 ,¯t3
∣∣∣∣
[
M∑
m=1
(t˜m2+u˜m2)
]
modΛ
J
m′2,
Q
ΛJ
m′2
(
M∑
m=1
(t˜m2+u˜m2)),
[
M∑
m=1
(t˜m3+u˜m3)
]
modΛ
J
m′′3,
Q
ΛJ
m′′3
(
M∑
m=1
(t˜m3+u˜m3)),¯t1,D,z1
)
−223
≥ 1
nB
H
(
t¯2 ,¯t3
∣∣∣∣
[
M∑
m=1
(t˜m2+u˜m2)
]
modΛ
J
m′2,
[
M∑
m=1
(t˜m3+u˜m3)
]
modΛ
J
m′′3
)
− 1
nB
H
(
Q
ΛJ
m′2
(
M∑
m=1
(t˜m2+u˜m2)),
Q
ΛJ
m′′3
(
M∑
m=1
(t˜m3 + u˜m3))
∣∣∣∣t¯1, D, z1
)
− 223
(f)
≥ 1
nB
H
(
t¯2 ,¯t3
∣∣∣∣
[
M∑
m=1
(t˜m2+u˜m2)
]
modΛ
J
m′2,[
M∑
m=1
(t˜m3+u˜m3)
]
modΛ
J
m′′3
)
−223
− 1
nB
H
(
Q
ΛJ
m′2
(
M∑
m=1
(t˜m2+u˜m2)),QΛJ
m′′3
(
M∑
m=1
(t˜m3+u˜m3))
)
≥ 1
nB
H
(
t¯2 ,¯t3
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[
M∑
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(t˜m2+u˜m2)
]
modΛ
J
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J
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H
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(
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Q
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(g)
≥ 1
nB
H
(
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modΛ
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J
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J
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m(h
2
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J
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J
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)
−δ(2)−δ(3)−223
(h)
=
1
nB
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2
log
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J
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J
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J
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(k)
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(2)
comb,3+R
(3)
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1
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log
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J
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log
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m(h
2
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2
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J
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J
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−δ(2)−δ(3)−223 (21)
In the above inequalities, inequality (f) holds since condition-
ing reduces entropy. Inequality (g) is deduced by applying
Lemma 1 in [16] to lattice codewords
∑M
m=1(t˜m2 + u˜m2))
and
∑M
m=1(t˜m3 + u˜m3)). Equality (h) is deduced from
Crypto Lemma in [17] and the fact that the lattice sets used
for encoding the jamming signals were chosen such that
it would be denser than the lattice sets used for encoding
the message signals. Finally, equality (k) is resulted from
the independence of codewords t¯2 and t¯3 and the rates at
which they were generated according to the achievable scheme
in Section IV. Next, we plug the lower bound in (21) to
the second term in (19). Then, following (9) we obtain:
1
nB I(W2,W3;y1) ≤ δ(2)+δ(3)+223+2+3. Now, define
′ , δ(2) + δ(3) + 223 + 2 + 3, which tends to zero as n
and B approach infinity. Thus, the analysis of weak secrecy
for the joint messages (W2,W3) at receiver 1 is completed.
Proofs of weak secrecy for the unintended message pairs at
receiver 2 and receiver 3 are established similarly. 
Extension to an arbitrary K > 2
For the general case of K > 2, the codebook construction
is performed similar to K = 3 case. However, in this case,
each message is divided into M , T 2K−2 independent sub-
messages where T is some large number. Also, secure rates
R` for ` ∈ {1, . . . ,K} are chosen as R` = R(`)comb,K −
1
2 max k∈{1,...,K}
k 6=`
(
log
(∑M
m=1(h
2
kPm`+g
2
`kP
J
m`)
g2`kP
J
m′`
))
+ `, where
` > 0 is a small number that vanishes as N →∞.
Also, the encoding step is performed similar to K = 3
case. The beam-forming functions used at the transmitter and
at helpers are extended as in the following:
f(m,`,h,g1,g2,...,gK)=h
r1
1 h
r2
2 ...h
r`−1
`−1 h
r`
`+1...h
rK−1
K
×grK`1 g
rK+1
`2 ...g
rK+`−2
``−1 g
rK+`−1
``+1 ...g
r2K−2
`K , (22)
where (r1, r2, . . . , r2K−2) = φK(m), in which φK(.) is a one-
to-one mapping from the set {1, . . . ,M} to set of tuples with
2K − 2 elements, i.e., (r1, r2, . . . , r2K−2), whose elements
take values from the set {1, . . . , T}. Also, in (22), vector g`
is defined as g` , [g`1, g`2, . . . , g`K ]T . Decoding at each
receiver is performed using the asymmetric compute-and-
forward framework as in the case of K = 3; the difference
here is that each receiver decodes an effective K-user MAC
to estimate its intended messages. Also, the the weak secrecy
proof is a straightforward extension of K = 3 case.
Proof of Corollary 1:
The soundness of Corollary 1 is proven in two steps: step 1
is to show that the second term in (4) is constant with respect
to power constraint P . Note that Pm` and P Jm` are portions
of powers allocated for transmitting the `-th confidential
message by the transmitter and the jamming signal by helper `,
respectively. Note that the power allocation must be performed
in such a way that it satisfies power constraints in (5-6). Hence,
we have Pm` = αm`P and Pm` = αJm`P , for some constants
0 < αm`, α
J
m` < 1. As a result, the second term in (4) can
be rewritten as 12 maxk
(
log
(
P (
∑
m h
2
kαm`+g
2
`kα
J
m`)
Pg2`kα
J
m∗`
))
. Notice
that the factor P would be canceled out from the top and
bottom of the fraction and the rest is a constant with respect to
power P . In step 2, we show that the first term in (4) provides
1
K degrees of freedom. Hence, total secure degrees of freedom
provided by all confidential messages is
∑K
`=1
1
K = 1. Note
that in (4), R(`)comb,K is the smallest combination rate among
the optimal set of K combination rates for the effective K-
user MAC that receiver ` perceives. It was shown in Corollary
5 in [11] that for almost every channel gain vector, the degrees
of freedom provided by each of the K optimal combination
rates is 1K . Thus, R
(`)
comb,K provides
1
K degrees of freedom as
well and this holds for all ` ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. As a result, total
secure degrees of freedom provided in our achievable scheme
is equal to 1, this is indeed optimal. Note that for a Gaussian
broadcast channel with confidential messages s.d.o.f. ≤ 1,
since the optimal degrees of freedom for a Gaussian broadcast
channel without security constraints is 1 which serves as an
upper bound in our security scenario [5].
V. CONCLUSION
We investigated transmitting confidential messages through
the Gaussian broadcast channel with K > 2 receivers and
K helpers. We offered an achievable scheme which achieves
secure rates that operate within a constant gap from sum secure
capacity.
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